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Creating a Market for Clean air: the air 




The Air Pollution Control (Amendment) Ordinance 2008 was passed in 
July 2008. This ordinance establishes an emissions trading scheme to facilitate 
pollution reduction by the two electricity generation companies operating in Hong 
Kong. This article analyses the features of this scheme from a legal and regulatory 
perspective, and advances three claims. First, the regulatory authority plays a 
significant coordination and oversight role, which may be necessary to steer the 
market and to ensure the environmental integrity of the scheme. This underscores 
the need to be cautious of claims of the cost-effectiveness and administrative ease 
of emissions trading, particularly in the context of trading across jurisdictions 
which differ in environmental quality, laws and enforcement. Secondly, the 
environmental effectiveness of the emissions trading scheme is questionable given 
the size of the market. Finally, this article draws parallels between the Hong Kong 
scheme and the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism and argues 
that an independent regulatory body is essential to guarantee due process and 
environmental integrity.
Introduction
The Air Pollution Control (Amendment) Ordinance 2008 (the “Amend-
ment Ordinance”) was passed by the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region in July 2008.1 This ordinance establishes an 
emissions trading scheme (ETS) to facilitate pollution reduction by the two 
electricity generation companies operating in the territory. Emissions trad-
ing programmes allow polluters to avoid pollution reductions at a regulated 
source, if they provide an equivalent reduction elsewhere. The equivalent 
reduction can be made at another source controlled by the polluter or 
through purchasing allowances from another facility. The Amendment 
Ordinance was passed with little fanfare. It may have been viewed as yet 
* Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, the University of Hong Kong.
1 Order No 31 of 2008. The Bill was introduced on 6 February 2008 (Legislative Council official 
website, available at http://www.legco.gov.hk/english/index.htm, accessed 11 June 2008). See Part 
IVB of the Air Pollution Control Ordinance (Cap 311).
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another step in the government’s rather lacklustre efforts to reduce air pol-
lution which was unlikely to yield significant results.2 Observers may also 
have been sceptical of the regulatory merit of creating an ETS that would 
effectively involve only two market players as Hong Kong’s electricity needs 
are met by two providers, Hong Kong Electric and China Light and Power. 
After all, the basic economics of emissions trading require a sizeable num-
ber of regulated entities, preferably facing significant disparities in pollution 
abatement costs, in order to identify cost-effective pollution reduction op-
portunities.3 Interesting as the question of the scheme’s cost-effectiveness 
may be, this paper does not seek to evaluate the economic feasibility of the 
ETS but to analyse its features from a legal and regulatory perspective.
This article advances three claims. First, the features of the scheme 
introduced by the Amendment Ordinance are such that the regulatory 
authority plays a significant coordination and oversight role, particularly 
in the approval process for the sale and purchase of emission credits. The 
level of regulatory oversight may be necessary to steer the market (given 
its small and illiquid nature) and to ensure the environmental integrity of 
the scheme. This underscores the need to be cautious of claims of the cost-
effectiveness and administrative ease of emissions trading, particularly in 
the context of trading across jurisdictions which differ in environmental 
quality, laws and enforcement. Secondly, a major issue in emissions trading 
is the state of the market. If there is no active trading of allowances, there 
cannot be strong incentives that will influence abatement behaviour. Trad-
ing activity amongst four power plants, three of which are owned by the 
same company, is not likely to be vigorous. This brings the environmental 
effectiveness of the ETS into question. Further, the small size of the market 
places limitations on how far the regulators can tinker with the features of 
the ETS to enhance its environmental effectiveness. Finally, this article ad-
vances the argument that the Amendment Ordinance should not be viewed 
narrowly as simply establishing an ETS that regulates the Hong Kong power 
plants only. Instead, it is a preliminary step towards developing a Pearl Riv-
er Delta (PRD)-wide scheme which could eventually be linked up to other 
2 Air quality in Hong Kong has deteriorated significantly in recent years and the public has expressed 
dissatisfaction with the government’s efforts to tackle the air pollution problem and develop a 
long-term air quality management strategy. See Council for Sustainable Development’s Report on 
the Better Air Quality Engagement Process, February 2008, available at http://www.susdev.org.hk/
en/councilreport.htm (accessed 9 January 2009); Environmental Protection Department, “Review 
of Air Quality Objectives”, available at http://www.epd.gov.hk/epd/english/environmentinhk/air/
air_quality_objectives/air_quality_objectives.html (accessed 9 January 2009). The attempt by the 
Clean Air Foundation to challenge the government’s air pollution control policy via judicial re-
view is also an indication of the degree of public dissatisfaction; see Clean Air Foundation Limited 
and Gordon David Oldham v the Government of the HKSAR, Constitutional and Administrative 
Law List No 35 of 2007.
3 Anil Markandya et al, Dictionary of Environmental Economics (Earthscan, 2001), p 77.
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emissions trading schemes that are being implemented on the mainland. 
The PRD scheme is modelled on the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) which allows countries facing emissions reduction tar-
gets to meet their legal obligations by earning credits for projects carried 
out in developing countries that do not face emission caps under the Kyoto 
Protocol.4 It is arguable that, similar to the CDM, participants in a pollu-
tion reduction project under the PRD scheme face aligned incentives to 
maximise the number of allowances generated by a project and to decrease 
their price.5 How to ensure that the PRD scheme leads to real environmen-
tal improvement is a difficult issue and if a lesson were to be taken from the 
experience of the CDM, would require setting up an independent regula-
tory body.
Part I provides a brief theoretical overview of emissions trading. Part II 
describes and analyses the ETS as well as develops the arguments for the 
first two claims made above. Part III examines the ETS as part of a wider re-
gional scheme that is similar to the CDM. Drawing on the literature on the 
CDM, this part argues that the combination of aligned incentives amongst 
the market players and the difficulties of cross-border monitoring and en-
forcement warrant careful consideration of how to design an appropriate 
regulatory framework. Part IV concludes.
I: A Theoretical Overview
What is Emissions Trading?
There are two main types of emissions trading programs – “cap- and- trade” 
and “baseline credit” systems.6 If the coverage of the ETS were limited sole-
ly to Hong Kong power plants, the scheme would be a classic cap-and-trade 
4 The Clean Development Mechanism is established under Art 12 of the Kyoto Protocol 37 ILM 
(1998) 22.
5 It has been noted that rather than competing like typical market players, participants in the CDM 
have a common interest in demonstrating a greater level of emissions reductions from a project and 
exchanging a greater amount of CERs, see C. O’Brian and K.N. Ortega, “Three Years after Imple-
mentation, the CDM Moves Markets, and Matures in New Directions”, Latham and Watkins, Client 
Alert 658, 2 January 2008, 5.
6 K. Turner, D. Pearce and I. Bateman, Environmental Economics: An Elementary Introduction (Balti-
more: John Hopkins University Press, 1993), p 181. There is a voluminous literature on emissions 
trading. See, generally, OECD, Implementing Domestic Tradable Permits for Environmental Protec-
tion (Paris: OECD, 1999); Joseph Kruger, Companies and Regulators in Emissions Trading Programs 
(Washington DC: Resources for the Future, 2005) Discussion Paper 05-03; European Environ-
ment Agency, Using the Market for Cost-Effective Environmental Policy (Luxemborg: EEA, 2006); 
R. Stavins, “Lessons from the American Experiment with Market-Based Environmental Policies” 
(2001) John F Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Faculty Research Working Papers 
Series, Working Paper No 22.2002.
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scheme. The wider PRD scheme effectively combines features of cap-and-
trade and baseline credit, as discussed further below.
Under a cap and trade scheme, the regulator determines an acceptable 
level of emissions, ie a “cap”. The cap is usually a target that is lower than 
“business as usual” emissions levels. Once the cap is established, allowances 
that permit the emission of a stipulated amount of pollutant will be allocat-
ed amongst firms. The total amount of emissions allowed by the aggregate 
quota is equivalent to the cap. A firm that wishes to emit more than its 
quota has to purchase additional allowances or it risks exceeding its quota, 
thereby incurring criminal and/or civil liability.
Allowance trading is premised on the assumption that firms are eco-
nomically rational profit-maximising actors. Therefore, a firm that can 
abate pollution at a cost lower than the market price of an allowance will 
do so up to the level where the price of abatement is equal to the allowance 
price. It then sells its surplus allowances to firms that find it more costly to 
reduce pollution than to buy allowances to meet emission targets. Cost-ef-
fectiveness is achieved when all firms abate to the point where the marginal 
costs of further abatement is equal to the permit price. The long-term goal 
of a cap and trade system is to reduce total emissions to a level below that 
established by the cap.7 This can be achieved by gradually reducing the size 
of the cap.
In a project-based baseline credit system, the source’s business-as-usual 
emissions baseline representing its emissions over a period of time will 
be calculated taking into account several factors including the source’s 
predicted emissions growth, technological improvements and other abate-
ment opportunities. Credits are earned when the firm carried out a project 
that reduces emissions to a level below its business-as-usual baseline. This 
mechanism lies at the heart of the CDM. Under the CDM, an Annex I 
Party (known as such because it is listed in Annex I to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and is legally 
obliged to reduce its GHG emissions by the amount stipulated in Annex 
B of the Kyoto Protocol), usually a developed country, can receive credits 
known as Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) for investing in an emis-
sions- reducing project in a developing country. The CDM provides Annex 
I countries with the intrinsic incentive to invest in carbon abatement proj-
ects in non-Annex I countries where the costs of abatement are less than 
in developed countries.8 The credits are tradable on international carbon 
7 K. Turner, D. Pearce and I. Bateman (n 6 above), p 183.
8 Note that the CDM has a two-fold aim of helping Annex I Parties meet their emission targets in a 
cost-effective way and promoting sustainable development in the developing countries according 
to Art 12(2) of the Kyoto Protocol.
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markets and examples of CDM projects include renewable energy, energy 
efficiency, and reforestation projects. In order to ensure that CDM projects 
generate real emission reductions, they must meet the additionality re-
quirement. The additionality requirement may be explained as such: CDM 
project activities must result in reducing or absorbing (sequestering) green-
house gases (GHGs) that are “real and measurable and would not have 
occurred in the absence of the proposed project activity”.9 In other words, 
to qualify for credits, a project activity must demonstrate that GHG emis-
sions were reduced against the “baseline” of GHG emissions under business-
as-usual circumstances.
The Theoretical Advantages of Emissions Trading
While environmental economists have studied the use of property rights 
to address environmental externalities for a long time, legal scholars only 
began to seriously look into the use of economic incentive programmes in 
the 1980s as dissatisfaction with US environmental policy grew and the 
root cause of the problems was perceived to be the nature of traditional 
command and control regulation.10 It is therefore useful to keep in mind 
that the theoretical literature on emissions trading is heavily influenced by 
the American experience and many of the benefits of emissions trading are 
perceived vis-à-vis traditional “command and control” regulation.11 Further, 
as Driesen has argued, the popularity of market-based instruments such as 
emissions trading has sometimes had little to do with the competing mer-
its of the various instruments. Instead, governments which tend towards 
a laissez-faire free market ideology have found market-based instruments 
attractive.12 This part of the article will briefly set out the arguments that 
9 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Report of the Confer-
ence of the Parties on its seventh session, Marrakesh, 29 Oct–10 No 2001). Addendum part two: 
Action taken by the Conference of the Parties. Vol II. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add. 2, p 20.
10 By the late 1970s, excessive bureaucratic centralisation in the hands of the federal Environmental 
Protection Agency, rigidity, high costs, extensive litigation by industry and environmental groups, 
the consequent burden on the court system, and delay were causing great dissatisfaction with US 
environmental policy. Some scholars, including Ackerman and Stewart, argued that the root cause 
of the problems was the nature of traditional command and control regulation which depended on 
extensive standard-setting and did not take into account the extensive variations in the physical, 
social and environmental conditions across the states within the US, amongst other things. They 
therefore advocated the use of economic incentive systems which they argued to be more efficient 
and effective. See, for example, Richard B. Stewart, “Controlling Environmental Risks Through 
Economic Incentives” (1987–1988) 13 Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 153; Bruce A. Ack-
erman and Richard B. Stewart, “Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case for Market 
Incentives” (1987–1988) 13 Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 171.
11 See David M. Driesen, “Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Program?: Replacing the 
Command and Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy” (1998) 55 Washington and Lee Law Re-
view 289 for discussion about the fallacy of this dichotomy.
12 David Driesen, “Economic Instruments for Sustainable Development” in Benjamin J. Richardson 
and Stepan Wood, Environmental Law for Sustainability (Hart Publishing, 2006).
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have been advanced in support of emissions trading, though by no means 
are these claims free from contention.13
First, emissions trading is said to achieve large cost savings by giving 
firms with relatively low pollution control costs the incentive to control 
above the level mandated by uniform regulation, while allowing firms 
with high costs to abate less. This minimises overall compliance costs. In 
jurisdictions where competitiveness is a significant concern, minimising 
compliance costs allays concerns that environmental regulation may put 
domestic companies at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis foreign com-
panies and force industries to relocate to jurisdictions with more lax or less 
costly environmental regulation.14 There is little empirical support for the 
argument that firms will relocate because of the costs of environmental 
regulatory compliance, especially since such costs would form an almost 
negligible percentage of a firm’s overall operating costs and a firm’s deci-
sion to relocate, especially after investment capital has been “sunk”, would 
be affected by other considerations such as labour costs, tax treatment and 
market access.15 However, to the extent that concerns about competitive-
ness exist, emissions trading is an attractive regulatory option because it 
purports to minimise the costs of environmental clean-up.
Secondly, emissions trading is said to encourage flexibility in control 
technologies. According to such arguments, command and control regula-
tion tends to mandate the use of specific technology or abatement method, 
yet regulators are often not the best people to decide on the choice of 
abatement methods because they lack sufficient information regarding a 
firm’s abatement costs. Thus, giving firms the freedom to decide on their 
preferred abatement methods promotes better regulation while benefiting 
firms.16
Thirdly, emissions trading provides an ongoing incentive (ie that firms can 
make money by doing so) to invest in environmentally superior technolo-
gies and devise new products to further reduce pollution. Stewart argues 
that such technological innovation is vital for maintaining long-term eco-
13 See discussion in R. Baldwin, “Regulation Lite: The Rise of Emissions Trading” (2008) 2 Regulation 
and Governance 193, 196–205.
14 Conversely, environmentalists are concerned that competitiveness concerns will induce states 
to lower environmental standards for fear that companies and industries will relocate to states 
with less strict environmental regulation, leading to a downward spiral in environmental stand-
ards as states adjust and readjust their standards to “attract” investment until neither state has an 
incentive to change its standard further. See R. Revesz, “Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: 
Rethinking the ‘Race-to-the-Bottom’ Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation” (1992) 67 
New York University Law Review 1210, 1213–1215.
15 D.C. Esty and D. Geradin, “Environmental Protection and International Competitiveness: A Con-
ceptual Framework” (1998) 32 Journal of World Trade 5.
16 Robert W. Hahn and Robert N. Stavins, “Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation: A New Era 
from an Old Idea?” 18 Ecology Law Quarterly 109.
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nomic growth without simultaneously increasing pollution and other forms 
of environmental degradation.17 Further, innovation will support the devel-
opment of environmental technology and services markets.
Fourthly, some scholars argue that emissions trading, being an economic 
incentive system, places fewer demands upon institutions and human re-
sources than command and control regulation does.18 While command 
and control regulation would require frequent site inspections to verify 
that compliance standards are being met or the prescribed pollution reduc-
tion equipment is being used, these scholars suggest that emissions trading 
schemes entail relatively lower regulatory costs as they run on their own ac-
cord once the system is put in place.
Fifthly, emissions trading can be used to provide the government with 
an appropriate and significant source of revenue.19 Firms, by purchasing 
permits to emit pollutants, may be regarded as effectively paying for the 
privilege of using the public’s air resources.
Finally, Stewart and Ackerman argue that emissions trading can en-
hance the democratic accountability of environmental policy decisions. 
Public discussions on emissions trading can avoid the technical jargon and 
technological questions that bewilder most people apart from the techno-
crats. Instead, the discussion can focus on the basics of which risks should 
be controlled, and by how much. “The great virtue of the marketable per-
mit program is that it puts the question in an operational form accessible to 
the general public”.20
II: The Emissions Trading Scheme for Hong Kong’s Power Sector
The Air Pollution Control Ordinance (APCO) is the principal law for 
managing air quality in Hong Kong, and regulates air pollution such as 
power plant emissions, motor vehicle fuel composition and emissions, as-
bestos control, construction dust and industrial emissions.21 Section 13 of 
the APCO requires the licensing of premises to be used for the conduct of 
“specified processes”. Schedule 1 of the APCO sets out a list of specified 
17 Richard B. Stewart, “Regulation, Innovation and Administrative Law: A Conceptual Framework” 
(1981) 69 California Law Review 1259.
18 Panayotou, Economic Instruments for Environmental Management and Sustainable Development (Ge-
neva/New York: United Nations Environment Programme, 1994); Richard B. Stewart, “Controlling 
Environmental Risks Through Economic Incentives” (1987–1988) 13 Columbia Journal of Environ-
mental Law 153, 160.
19 Richard B. Stewart, “Controlling Environmental Risks Through Economic Incentives” (1987–
1988) 13 Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 153, 160.
20 Bruce A. Ackerman and Richard B. Stewart, “Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic 
Case for Market Incentives” (1987–1988) 13 Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 171, 189.
21 Cap 311.
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processes, including electricity generation involving the burning of fossil 
fuels in a facility of installed generation capacity exceeding five megawatts. 
As such, all four power plants operated by China Light and Power and 
Hong Kong Electric, hold licenses to conduct specified processes through 
which the environmental authority regulates their atmospheric emissions. 
The definition of “Specified License” was introduced by the Amendment 
Ordinance, and refers only to the licenses issued to the power plants under 
section 13 of the APCO, presumably because the ETS applies to the power 
sector only.22
In order to meet the 2010 pollutant reduction targets jointly agreed 
upon by the HKSAR government and the Guangdong provincial govern-
ment in 2002, the power companies were informed of these targets in 2003, 
and of the fact that the environmental authority would set emission caps 
in any specified licenses issued or renewed henceforth.23 It can be inferred 
that during the period between 2003 and 2008 (when the Amendment 
Ordinance was passed), the authority and the power companies were en-
gaged in negotiations over the imposition of emission caps which the power 
companies are likely to have resisted. As with the introduction of emissions 
trading in other jurisdictions, particularly California’s RECLAIM scheme 
and the sulphur dioxide Title IV program in the United States,24 the ETS is 
22 “[S]pecified license” is defined as “a licence to conduct the process specified in item 7 of Sch 1, 
other than a licence to conduct such process for the sole purpose of providing a stand-by power 
supply in the event of a loss of normal power supply”. Item 7 of Sch 1 refers to “Electricity Works”.
23 HKSAR Environmental Protection Department, “Government’s Environmental Policy for the 
Power Sector”, available at http://www.epd.gov.hk/epd/english/environmentinhk/air/prob_solu-
tions/air_problems.html (accessed 15 January 2009). In April 2002, as a step towards improving 
regional air quality, the Hong Kong government and the Guangdong Provincial Government 
“reached a consensus…to reduce, on a best endeavour basis” the emissions of four major air pol-
lutants, namely sulphur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxides (NOx) respirable suspended particulates 
(RSP) and volatile organic compounds (VOC) by 40, 20, 55 and 55% respectively in the region 
by 2010. This agreement between the Hong Kong government and the Guandong Provincial 
Government is described as a “consensus…on a best endeavour basis” in the Legislative Council 
Brief on the Air Pollution Control (Amendment) Bill 2008 (File Ref: EP CR 9/150/21) as well as 
the January 2008 report by the Environmental Protection Department to the Legislative Council 
Panel on Environmental Affairs, “Progress of Measures to Improve Air Quality” (File Ref: CB(1) 
647.07-08(15)) (“EPD January 2008 report”). The Secretary of the Environment Edward Yau has, 
however, described the agreement as a “bilateral binding agreement”; see Secretary for the Environ-
ment Edward Yau, “HK, Guandong pact a launching pad”, Address at the Hong Kong Institution 
of Engineers’ Environmental Division Annual Seminar on “Environmental Policies and Practices 
in the Mainland and the HKSAR” 9 April 2008, available online at http://news.gov.hk/en/cat-
egory/ontherecord/080409/html/080409en11002.htm (accessed 12 June 2008). This suggests that 
the obligation to meet the 2010 emission reduction targets is legally binding (and therefore not to 
be pursued on a best endeavour basis only) or that the Hong Kong government regards the agree-
ment as a significant platform for cross-border environmental cooperation and therefore de facto 
binding, though not de jure.
24 A. Denny Ellerman, “The US SO2 Cap-and-Trade Programme” and David Harrison, “Ex Post Eval-
uation of the RECLAIM Emissions Trading Programmes for the Los Angeles Air Basin” in Tradable 
Permits: Policy Evaluation, Design and Reform (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment, OECD, Paris, 2004).
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likely to have been a quid pro quo for the power companies’ agreement to 
the emission caps. It should be noted that the authority does not have much 
bargaining power due to the statutory limitations on its discretionary power 
to impose or amend license conditions. Section 17 of the APCO grants 
the authority discretion to impose new or amended terms or conditions on 
a license which is already in force if it considers such action necessary in 
the public interest. However, this power is subject to the limitation that 
“[u]nless the Authority considers that the continuation of the specified 
process to which the licence relates would be, or be likely to be, prejudicial 
to health he may exercise [this power] only with the prior approval of the 
[Chief Executive], as to both the exercise of the power and the manner of 
the exercise of the power, or with the agreement of the licence holder”. 
The difficulty of proving that power generation would be or is likely to be 
prejudicial to health would have precluded the option of acting without 
the Chief Executive’s approval or the licence holder’s agreement. Further, 
given the powerful economic interests at play, and the pragmatic need to 
maintain cordial relations between the regulated entities and the regulator, 
acting under section 17 would be a measure of last resort.
The key features of the ETS are as follows. Each specified license will 
be allocated a quantity of allowances for each pollutant (namely, sulphur 
dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and respirable suspended particulates) on an an-
nual basis.25 The allowances are allocated according to market share of the 
local power generation market.26 The license holder’s legal obligation is to 
ensure that actual emissions from the licensed premises do not exceed the 
permissible level of emissions each year. However, as described earlier in 
Part I, emissions trading gives the license holder the option of acquiring al-
lowances in lieu of reducing the pollution itself. The overall environmental 
benefit is the same – one tonne of a pollutant is prevented from entering 
the atmosphere.27 Section 26L provides the legal basis for the acquisi-
tion and transfer of allowances amongst the power plants. Section 26M 
gives the power plants the option of acquiring “emission credits” which for 
compliance purposes have the function and value of an allowance, but are 
created by pollution reduction projects carried out under the Implementa-
25 Section 26G(2) states that, in deciding on the allocation of allowances, the Secretary of the En-
vironment shall have as his purpose the attainment and maintenance of any relevant air quality 
objective, have regard to the best practicable means for pollution control, and whether the emis-
sions of that type of pollutant would be, or be likely to be, prejudicial to health.
26 See Annex 2 of draft Technical Memorandum (TM) in “Bills Committee on Air Pollution Control 
(Amendment) Bill 2008, List of Follow-up Actions Arising from the Discussion at the Meeting on 
19 May 2008” Document Ref: CB(1) 1643/07-08(02). In the draft TM, market share is in reference 
to the period from 1999 to 2003 inclusive.
27 “[E]mission allowance” is defined as “the entitlement to emit one tonne of that type of pollutant in 
an emission year from a licensed premises; and, for the avoidance of doubt, each such entitlement 
is quantified as one emission allowance.”
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tion Framework of the Emission Trading Pilot Scheme for Thermal Power 
Plants in the Pearl River Delta Region. This scheme will be discussed in de-
tail in Part III below. The government’s original intention was to allow the 
power plants unfettered freedom to acquire emission credits. However, in 
response to concerns raised in the Legislative Council discussions that the 
acquisition of credits would allow the power plants to do next to nothing 
to improve local air quality, section 26M now provides that a power plant 
may acquire in one year a total quantity of emission credits equivalent to 
no more than 15 per cent of the quantity of emission allowances allocated 
to it in that year.28 Further, the environmental agency is required to consult 
the Advisory Council on the Environment before it decides on an applica-
tion for the acquisition of emission credits.29 Section 26K provides for force 
majeure events, including the non-delivery of emission credits under a sale 
and purchase agreement. Under section 30B, a specified license holder that 
exceeds its emission cap faces monetary penalties and imprisonment (on 
second or subsequent convictions). Providing false information is also a 
punishable offence under section 30B.
Every acquisition or transfer of allowances and credits has to be re-
viewed and approved by the environmental agency. In a larger scheme, this 
sort of approval process might pose concerns about transaction costs but 
these costs are arguably negligible in a scheme regulating four power plants. 
In fact, given the duopolistic nature of the power sector (and therefore the 
emissions market), it is probably necessary for the regulator to play an ac-
tive role to prevent anti-competitive behaviour. The counter-argument 
that extensive regulatory intervention will hinder market development is 
moot as long as the power sector is not liberalised. The extent of the envi-
ronmental agency’s monitoring and enforcement role would also have been 
driven by concerns to ensure that the scheme is environmentally effective 
and brings about real pollution reductions in Hong Kong. Such concerns 
are particularly valid when it comes to allowing power plants to purchase 
emission credits from mainland power plants, as evidenced by the restric-
tion on the amount of credits that local power plants can purchase in each 
emission year and additional steps in the approval process. The need for a 
relatively high level of regulatory oversight and enforcement underscores 
the need to be cautious of claims of the cost-effectiveness and administra-
tive ease of emissions trading, particularly in the context of trading across 
jurisdictions which differ in environmental quality, laws and enforcement.
28 Bills Committee on Air Pollution Control (Amendment) Bill 2008, List of follow-up actions aris-
ing from the discussion at the meetings on 3, 5 and 6 June 2008, Document Ref: CB(1) 1873/07-
08(03).
29 Section 26M(6).
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The size of the ETS market also poses difficult questions. In a mar-
ket that comprises of four power plants, three of which are owned by the 
same company, active emissions trading is unlikely to take place. Yet, in 
the absence of active trading, there cannot be strong incentives that will 
influence abatement behaviour. The inability of the ETS to create the ap-
propriate incentives for market players to abate their pollution brings its 
environmental effectiveness into question. Further, the small size of the 
market places inherent limitations on the extent to which the regulator can 
modify certain features of the ETS to enhance environmental effectiveness. 
For example, some emissions trading schemes such as the US Title IV sul-
phur dioxide program permit the participation of individuals, citizen groups 
and private companies. This creates another avenue for the public to play 
a role in environmental governance through buying and “retiring” allow-
ances to realise an environmentally more stringent emissions cap. As such 
schemes involve a significant number of regulated entities, there is usually 
sufficient market liquidity to buffer against price shocks. Small schemes 
like the Hong Kong ETS will find it difficult to manage price volatility 
risks when environmentally-motivated actors seek to retire large number of 
allowances. Hypothetically, this could lead to a situation where the regula-
tor has to intervene with a price ceiling or halt trading to restore market 
stability. Once again, an ETS has to be of a certain size in order to be envi-
ronmentally effective. Using emissions trading to regulate the power sector 
appears to require more justification. Baldwin’s observations that emissions 
trading is all too often a politically convenient panacea and that its virtues 
really lie in its “acceptability” because it is non-threatening to the most 
powerful interests seem to be apt in this case.30
Part III below advances a different perspective on the ETS by placing it 
within a regional context and arguing that the ETS can be seen as a spring-
board for developing a Pearl River Delta (PRD)-wide scheme that could 
significantly improve air quality in the regional air shed (which includes 
Hong Kong).
30 R. Baldwin, “Regulation Lite: The Rise of Emissions Trading” (2008) 2 Regulation and Governance 
193–215.
06_Analysis.indd   279 10/15/09   8:06:42 PM
280 Jolene Lin (2009) HKLJ
III: A Regional “Clean Development Mechanism”
Instead of viewing the Amendment Ordinance as simply establishing an 
ETS that regulates the Hong Kong power plants only, it can be seen as 
a preliminary step towards developing a Pearl River Delta (PRD)-wide 
scheme which could eventually be linked up to other emissions trading 
schemes that are being implemented on the mainland. The legal framework 
for such a regional scheme was put in place in 2007, but was not effec-
tive for reasons that will be explained below. In the following discussion, 
we will examine the background to the formation of a regional ETS and 
how the PRD scheme resembles the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM). As in the case of the CDM, participants in a pollu-
tion reduction project under the PRD scheme face aligned incentives to 
inflate the amount of credits claimed. The more successful the PRD scheme 
is at generating credits, the more credits are available to Hong Kong power 
plants (and potentially other power plants on the mainland if the PRD 
scheme is linked to the other emissions trading schemes that are being 
developed on the mainland) to meet their emissions targets, and therefore 
the more important it is that each credit corresponds to real and measur-
able emission reductions. How to ensure that the PRD scheme leads to real 
environmental improvement, and not the creation of “hot air” credits, is a 
difficult issue. It will be argued below that a body independent of the en-
vironmental authorities which is tasked to evaluate and approve projects 
according to stringent environmental standards is necessary.
Background to the Development of a Regional ETS
Rapid industrialisation and urbanisation in Hong Kong and Guangdong 
has led to worsening air quality in the entire Pearl River delta region which 
shares a common air shed.31 (Note, however, that while regional sources 
certainly have an impact on Hong Kong’s air quality, recent research in-
dicates that local sources are the crucial factor affecting the territory’s air 
quality more than 50 per cent of the time. It is therefore clear that reducing 
air pollution in Hong Kong can have a significant positive impact on local 
air quality.32) Emissions trading found its way onto the agenda as a joint 
initiative between the Hong Kong and Guangdong authorities to reduce 
air pollution in the PRD region. In January 2007, five years after the Spe-
31 For discussion, see Lisa Hopkinson and Rachel Stern, “One Country, Two Systems, One Smog: 
Cross-Boundary Air Pollution Policy Challenges for Hong Kong and Guangdong” (2003) China 
Environment Series 6 (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars).
32 Alexis Lau et al, “Relative Significance of Local vs. Regional Sources: Hong Kong’s Air Pollution” 
(2007) (Hong Kong: Institute for the Environment (HKUST), ADM Capital Foundation, Civic 
Exchange), available online at http://www.cleanairnet.org/caiasia/1412/article-71393.html (ac-
cessed 10 February 2008).
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cial Panel on PRD Air Quality Management and Monitoring first proposed 
emissions trading as one of the measures to facilitate pollution reduc-
tion, the Pilot Scheme for Thermal Power Plants in the PRD Region was 
launched.33
The pilot scheme is voluntary in nature and, as its name suggests, is 
a learning-by-doing exercise to familiarise regulators and regulated enti-
ties alike with this relatively novel and complex environmental regulatory 
tool. The scheme provides for the Guangdong and Hong Kong authorities 
to impose emission caps on the power plants within their respective juris-
dictions.34 The guidelines contained in the Implementing Framework are 
premised on the assumption that projects will be initiated by trading part-
ners identified from the outset who must submit plans for approval by the 
authorities (of the respective trading partners). It is further assumed that 
the credits seller will be a Guangdong power plant, and the buyer a Hong 
Kong power plant. Given that the Implementation Framework is silent on 
many significant operational and legal issues and there has been no impetus 
to develop projects to generate credits for compliance purposes, it is not 
surprising that there has not been any recorded activity under the Pilot 
Scheme so far.
The Amendment Ordinance provides a legal framework that removes 
some of the uncertainties and risks that deterred Hong Kong power plants 
from carrying out emission reduction projects in the PRD region. It clarifies 
some of the important legal and operational issues that were not addressed 
in the Implementation Framework for the Pilot Scheme for Thermal Power 
Plants in the PRD Region, such as the legal basis for the use of cross-border 
credits by Hong Kong power plants, the relationship between the Pilot 
Scheme and the overall air pollution control legal framework to which 
Hong Kong power plants are subject, the method of allocating allowances, 
and how the authorities will address force majeure events such as the non-
delivery of credits by a Guangdong power plant. The imposition of caps on 
the Hong Kong power plants will also be crucial for creating the demand 
for emission credits that will give the regional scheme a kick-start.
Drawing Lessons from the Clean Development Mechanism
While there are limitations to the comparison that can be drawn between 
the PRD scheme and the CDM because of the differences in scale and 
complexity, it is worth looking to the CDM for the purpose of comparative 
analysis because it is by far the largest and most developed emissions offset 
33 “Implementation Framework of the Emissions Trading Pilot Scheme for Thermal Power Plants 
in the Pearl River Delta Region (the Pilot Scheme)”, Annex to Emissions Trading Pilot Scheme for 
Thermal Power Plants in the Pearl River Delta Region (CB(1) 972/06-07(05), February 2007).
34 Ibid, para 3.2.
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market ever created and to put it succinctly, “[i]f one wants to study offsets 
in the real world, one studies the CDM”.35
The PRD scheme is an “offset” program, that is, the emission credits is-
sued are a measure of the quantity of emissions that has been avoided or 
“offset” by pollution reduction projects. As in the case of the CDM, the 
use of offsets is likely to be perceived to be a win-win solution because they 
offer the Hong Kong power plants a low-cost pollution reduction option 
and offer the mainland power plants a source of funding to reduce the pol-
lution intensity of their energy production. However, because the project 
developers, the buyers of credits, and their respective governments have an 
inherent interest in either maximising profits or reducing compliance costs, 
they are no guarantors for the environmental integrity of projects. With this 
constellation of aligned incentives and the absence of a corrective system 
of checks and balances, the appropriateness of relying on offsets to reduce 
air pollution in the PRD region is questionable. Some scholars have argued 
in the context of the CDM that it is impossible to resolve the inherent 
tension between the demands of the market and environmental integrity 
and caution against the extensive use of offsets in climate change policy.36 
Others continue to believe that well-designed offset markets can play a role 
in engaging developing countries and encouraging investment in low-cost 
emission control strategies and their scholarship focuses on improving the 
design and governance of the CDM.37
A key institutional feature of the CDM governance structure is the Ex-
ecutive Board, a United Nations (UN) body which is responsible for the 
day-to-day supervision of the CDM. It is in effect a supranational regula-
tory agency.38 Amongst other things, the Executive Board takes decisions 
on methodologies and projects, mandates reviews and revisions to project 
applications, and issues the UN-approved credits upon verification by in-
dependent third-party auditors known as Designated Operational Entities 
(DOEs). With regard to ensuring the environmental integrity of the CDM, 
Voigt has argued that only the Executive Board has the capacity and sole 
responsibility to do so.39 The Executive Board is effectively the only feasible 
35 M.W. Wara and D.G. Victor, “A Realistic Policy on International Carbon Offsets”, Program on En-
ergy and Sustainable Development at Stanford University, Working paper #74, April 2008, 9.
36 Ibid.
37 For example, C. Voigt, “Responsibility for the Environmental Integrity of the CDM: Possibilities 
for Judicial Review of Executive Board Decisions” in D. Freeman and C. Streck (eds), Legal Aspects 
of Carbon Trading: Kyoto, Copenhagen and Beyond (Oxford University Press, 2009, forthcoming) 
(on file with author), C. Streck, “The Governance of the CDM: the Case for Strength and Stabil-
ity” (2007) 2 Environmental Liability 15, 91–100
38 This characterisation of the Executive Board as akin to a regulatory agency is not far-fetched; see 
R. Stewart, “U.S. Administrative Law: A Model for Global Administrative Law?” (2005) 68 Law 
and Contemp. Problems 63–109, 91.
39 C. Voigt, n 37 above.
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check on the worthiness of credits, given that all the parties involved in de-
veloping a project face aligned incentives to procure more credits and there 
are little, if any, incentives for the parties to ensure that these credits reflect 
real GHG reductions.
The PRD scheme does not envisage the creation of a regulatory body 
akin to the Executive Board, that is, an entity that is independent of the 
environmental authorities whose sole responsibility is the administration of 
the emissions trading scheme, including the monitoring and verification of 
projects. Instead, regulatory oversight of the projects will be provided joint-
ly by the Hong Kong and Guangdong environmental authorities. This does 
not bode well for the environmental integrity of the scheme – an indepen-
dent body is necessary to provide a check against the inherent incentives 
of all parties, including the environmental authorities, to reduce compli-
ance costs or maximise profits. Such an independent body is all the more 
necessary because the traditional checks and balances on executive action 
provided by judicial review and administrative procedures such as notice-
and-comment requirements in rule-making will not apply to the PRD 
scheme without great difficulty. It is arguable that a Hong Kong power plant 
involved in developing a cross-border pollution reduction project under 
the PRD scheme does so on the legal basis provided by section 26M of the 
Amendment Ordinance. A decision by the Hong Kong environmental au-
thority is susceptible to judicial review by the Hong Kong courts, but what 
about decisions jointly taken with its Guangdong counterpart? It is impos-
sible to imagine the courts extending its jurisdiction to review the decisions 
of a foreign executive agency or apportioning a jointly-made decision such 
that only that part of the decision made by the Hong Kong authority can 
be judicially reviewed. In any case, judicial review is not the appropriate 
mechanism for ensuring the environmental integrity of the scheme. It is 
highly unlikely that a Hong Kong power plant will seek judicial review out 
of concern that a project’s environmental merit is questionable. The courts 
also do not possess the technical expertise to evaluate a project’s environ-
mental soundness. These considerations point towards the conclusion that 
a body independent of both environmental authorities is required to evalu-
ate, monitor, and verify the pollution reduction projects if environmental 
integrity of the scheme is a priority.
An independent regulatory body does not need to be accompanied by 
a complex monitoring and approval system. The scheme is, after all, not 
a large one and there is no need to kill regulatory innovation with bu-
reaucracy. For example, there is no need to have third-party verification 
akin to that performed by the DOEs within the CDM system. In fact, the 
DOE verification system has been heavily criticised for its inefficacy and 
many projects undergo supplementary review after verification has been 
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performed by DOEs because the Executive Board hesitates to rely on the 
reports submitted by the DOEs.40 It is beyond the scope of this paper to de-
velop a design blueprint for this proposed regulatory body, but the point, to 
reiterate, is to create a body that can provide regulatory oversight indepen-
dent of the environmental agencies in order to ensure that projects carried 
out under the PRD scheme result in real reductions in sulphur dioxide, ni-
trogen oxides and RSPs, the pollutants that currently reduce quality of life 
for the people living in the PRD region.
IV: Conclusion
This article has discussed the latest regulatory innovation in air quality 
management in Hong Kong. The use of emissions trading to address air 
pollution, especially that caused by stationary and large sources such as 
industrial facilities and power generation plants, is theoretically sound and 
even superior because of the perceived advantages of cost-effectiveness 
and administrative ease. More importantly, the political acceptability of 
emissions trading by powerful economic interests has rendered it an ex-
tremely popular environmental regulatory instrument today. However, as 
this article has ventured to argue, emissions trading works only in certain 
circumstances and its application in Hong Kong to reduce the pollution 
caused by power generation is of dubious regulatory merit. Seen as part of 
a wider development of a regional scheme, there is potential for emissions 
trading to deliver cost-effective pollution reduction in one of the world’s 
most economically vibrant areas which has also experienced great envi-
ronmental degradation in recent decades. The importance of the scheme’s 
environmental integrity cannot be over-emphasised and this paper has ar-
gued that an independent regulator is necessary. On a concluding note, air 
pollution policy in Hong Kong will continue to require significant tweak-
ing in the years to come as air quality is a perennial concern. Cross-border 
cooperation in environmental matters appears set to continue apace. The 
experiment in a regional emissions trading scheme is still in its early stage, 
and it will be interesting to watch how developments unfold.
40 M.W. Wara and D.G. Victor, “A Realistic Policy on International Carbon Offsets”, Program on En-
ergy and Sustainable Development at Stanford University, Working paper #74, April 2008, 19. 
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